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■ Abstract It is a truism to say that primates develop, but it is also important to acknowledge that development 
occurs across many domains, including motor behavior, socioemotional behavior, communication, and 
cognition. In this review, we focus on those aspects of development that impact social cognition outcomes in 
infancy. Triadic engagements, such as those of joint attention, cooperation, and intentional communication, 
develop in the first year of life in chimpanzees and humans. Joint attention, for example, occurs when infants 
coordinate their attention to a social partner while also attending to an object or event. Hominoids are strongly 
influenced by experiences during early development, especially experiences that are foundational for these 
coordinated triadic engagements. Purported species differences in triadic engagements are highlighted in current 
evolutionary theories of primate social cognition, but conclusions about species differences are unfounded when 
development is ignored. Developmental experiences must be matched, controlled, or systematically varied in 
experimental designs that make cross-species comparisons. Considerations of development, across species and 
across rearing experiences, would contribute to more accurate evolutionary theories of primate social cognition. 
DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PRIMATE SOCIAL COGNITION 
Since the 1960s, scientists have offered different theories to explain the evolution of 
primate social cognition. Beginning with Jolly (1966), investigators proposed a distinct 
evolutionary path for social intelligence because social intelligence was based on the 
need to function in complex societies and both supported social learning and depended 
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on it. Humphrey (1976) was also interested in the adaptations that allowed for learning 
flexibly during ontogeny, in particular, learning the complexities of sociality. Parker & 
Gibson (1979) presented one of the first evolutionary theories of primate cognition, and 
it was explicitly developmental (Table 1). Recent influential theories of the evolution of 
primate social cognition, however, neglect to consider development in nonhuman 
primates; ignoring development is a significant problem because primates and their 
social cognition develop as a result of social and emotional experiences. For example, 
many theories consider only the abilities of adults in species other than human and 
disregard the influence of developmental experiences on outcomes (but see Boesch 
2012; Jablonka & Lamb 2007; Suomi 2004 for alternative perspectives). The shared 
intentionality model (Tomasello et al. 2005), the cultural intelligence hypothesis 
(Herrmann et al. 2007), the Vygotskian intelligence theory (Moll & Tomasello 2007),  
 
Table 1 Developmental considerations in selected theories of primate social cognition 
Theory/model Is development considered for 
Humans?j Apes?j Monkeysj 
Social intelligencea Yes Yes Yes 
Piagetian 
developmentb 
Yes Yes Yes 
Theory of mindc Yes No na 
Machiavellian 
intelligenced 
No No No 
Social braine No No No 
Shared intentionalityf Yes No na 
Cultural intelligenceg Yes No  na 
Vygotskian 
intelligenceh 
Yes No na 
Cumulative culturei Yes No No 
 
References: aJolly 1966, Humphrey 1976; bParker & Gibson 1977, 1979; cPremack & Woodruff 1978; 
dByrne & Whiten 1988, Whiten & Byrne 1988; eDunbar 1998; fTomasello et al. 2005; gHerrmann et al. 2007; 
hMoll & Tomasello 2007; iDean et al. 2012, Tennie et al. 2009. 
j
“Yes” indicates that developmental change in this group was considered specifically in the indicated paper; 
“no” indicates that development, developmental experiences, and/or developmental change for this group was 
not considered in the indicated paper; "na" (not applicable) indicates that this group was not considered in the 
indicated paper. 
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and the cumulative culture model (Dean et al. 2012; Tennie et al. 2009; Tomasello et al. 
1993a) are offered as theoretical and evolutionary explanations of “human-unique” 
social cognition. Unfortunately, the study designs upon which these theories are built 
cannot identify social cognition that is unique to humans, undermining the core premises 
of these theories. These studies have the following three fatal flaws, which are the 
subject of this article: (a) a reliance on an experimental design that inaccurately depicts 
group-specific differences as “species” differences because the design neglects the 
impact of developmental experiences as confounds; (b) a lack of consideration of 
development in nonhuman primates; and (c) exclusive reliance on a single human group 
without evidence that their social cognition outcomes are universal, especially among 
humans from different ecocultural settings (e.g., Keller 2007). 
HOW NEGLECT OF DEVELOPMENT IN PRIMATE SOCIAL COGNITION 
IMPACTS THE DATABASE: INVALID EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
Consider the hypothetical research design proposed by Leavens et al. (2008). Neonatal 
representatives of two closely related, but genetically distinct groups, human boys and 
human girls, are assigned to two different treatment groups. Boys are assigned to rearing 
circumstances like those of institutionalized Romanian orphans, experiencing daily 
social and physical impoverishment and neglect. In contrast, the girls are assigned to a 
treatment in which they are raised by their biological families, experiencing frequent 
daily episodes of laughter, shared joy, cuddling, joint attention, and responsive care. At 
9--12 months of age, we assess each group’s ability to engage in joint attention with 
adults. We would likely find that the girl group outperformed the boy group (see the 
next section for brief review of the consequences of deprivation on social cognition). 
The interpretive question of vital importance not only to this paper, but to the 
comparative evolutionary discipline is, Can we conclude that there is a genetically based 
sex difference in joint attention between human boys and human girls given this research 
design? 
The answer to this question is obvious: No. This research design cannot support the 
conclusion that girls are superior to boys in joint attention (i.e., generalizing to all girls 
and all boys or identifying genes as the critical variable). The differences in 
developmental experiences (i.e., rearing history) between the boy group and the girl 
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group are irretrievably confounded with their systematic genetic differences. Certainly, 
there is no reason to think that we would find the same superiority of girls in joint 
attention if the assignments to the two different rearing conditions was reversed, i.e., if 
the girls were assigned to the impoverished rearing condition. 
Now consider Figure 1, which depicts precisely the same flawed research design. It 
depicts two groups of organisms whose genetic profiles systematically differ, although 
here, by simple substitution, the groups comprise human and ape neonates. It assigns the 
two groups to the same two rearing conditions as above: the ape group to experience 
impoverishment and neglect during development and the human group to experience 
warm, loving family life during development. Using the same outcome measure of joint 
attention, the likely result is a significant group difference, the human group displaying 
superior performance. Can we conclude from this research design that there is a 
genetically based species difference between apes and humans in joint attention? Of 
course not, for all the reasons outlined above. 
In this experimental design, a third variable reflects yet another way in which 
development in nonhumans is disregarded. Added to the groups’ systematic differences 
in genes and developmental experiences is the third confound: age at testing. In this 
design, the human group is tested during infancy (9--12 months), but the chimpanzee 
group is tested as juveniles (~4 years in captivity; Fragaszy & Bard 1997). Clearly, 
because no rational investigator would assert that there is a sex difference in the first 
research design with a two-way confound, we might reasonably expect, on logical 
grounds, that no contemporary researcher would assert that there is a species difference 
in the second research design, especially with a three-way confound (Figure 1). 
Unfortunately, this is far from the case: The results of such confounded experimental 
studies form the database for many of the contemporary evolutionary theories that claim 
“human-unique” social cognition (Table 1). 
No amount of pleading can rehabilitate the illogical conclusion that girls (or humans) 
are innately superior to boys (or apes) in joint attention on the basis of these 
experimental designs (Figure 1). We cannot, for example, argue that because it would 
be really difficult or very expensive to equate the developmental experiences of these 
boys and girls (or apes and humans) that we should accept at face value the conclusion 
of sex (or species) difference. We have no basis on which to conclude that it is more 
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natural for girls (or humans) to be raised with positive affective experiences and for boys 
(or apes) to be raised in institutional settings. The design presented in Figure 1 can 
never isolate genes as the explanatory factor accounting for the observed group 
differences in social cognition outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 1 Design flaws of current comparative studies. In this experimental design, developmental 
experiences and age at testing are not matched across groups and are confounded with genetic 
differences. Because developmental experiences strongly influence social cognition outcomes in 
apes and humans, this design can never isolate species as the explanatory factor accounting for 
group differences in social cognition. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COGNITION IN HUMANS 
Few theories deny the importance of development for social cognitive outcomes in 
humans. We find it surprising, however, that development is often ignored for 
nonhuman primates, especially when considering that apes, our closest evolutionary 
relatives, have a long period of infancy during which they are responsive to 
environmental stimuli. For human infants, we have known for decades that engagement 
with social partners and engagement with objects are essential developmental precursors 
for joint attention (e.g., Bakeman & Adamson 1984; Trevarthen & Aitken 2001). For 
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chimpanzees, we have known for decades that outcomes vary as a function of 
developmental experiences (see reviews by Bard & Leavens 2009; Leavens & Bard 
2011), but these developmental effects have generally been ignored in theory building 
(Table 1). There is a puzzling and widespread bias toward attributing poor performance 
in nonhuman primates to genetic factors (e.g., the species lacks a capacity) and yet 
attributing similar poor performance in humans to developmental factors (e.g., infants 
lack a capacity). In the following sections, we review early development of joint 
attention in humans and chimpanzees, identifying differential outcomes as a function of 
early developmental experiences. Using this evidence, we discuss why the consideration 
of development is absolutely essential when building meaningful and valid theories of 
the evolution of primate social cognition. 
We focus on the prototypical form of infant social cognition, that is, joint attention. 
Joint attention is a triadic ability, known as a “referential triangle,” “coordinated joint 
engagement” (Bakeman & Adamson 1984), or “intentional co-orientation to a common 
focus” (Leavens & Racine 2009), in which infants coordinate their attention to a social 
partner with their attention to an object or event. According to one of the most widely 
cited theories of primate social cognition, joint attention marks the developmental onset 
of shared intentionality (Tomasello et al. 2005). This form of social cognition is thought 
by some to be a precursor to “theory of mind” (Nelson et al. 2007; Tomasello et al. 
2005) or second-order intentionality (e.g., Rakoczy 2009). 
Human Normative Development 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of joint attention. In humans, joint attention 
emerges between 9 and 12 months and depends on a developmental history of early 
mutual engagement with social partners (peaking at 3 months) and a developmental 
history of early engagement with objects (from 5 months of age). In many urban and 
Western cultures, young human infants engage in face-to-face interactions with 
caregivers, with positive affective exchanges (i.e., primary intersubjectivity: Trevarthen 
1979; interpersonal engagement: Adamson 1996). By five months of age, human infants 
in these settings tend to shift their attention away from en face interactions with 
caregivers and toward exclusive interaction with objects. There appears to be a universal 
developmental milestone of increased manipulation of objects around 5--7 months of 
age (e.g., Bakeman et al. 1990). 
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Figure 2 Social cognition develops in human and in chimpanzee infants. Joint attention is a triadic 
skill that develops from cognitive abilities entwined with developmental histories of previous 
dyadic engagements with social partners and with objects (Bard et al. 2014b). Ages of emergence 
in these dyadic and triadic skills follow similar timelines in human and chimpanzee infants. 
These two strands of dyadic engagement (infants with social partners and infants with 
objects) intertwine with emerging cognitive abilities to allow infants to engage 
triadically in the final three months of the first year of life. Around 12 months of age, 
infants respond to adult bids and initiate joint attention by showing, offering, pointing to, 
and requesting objects, amid other shared practices (Racine & Carpendale 2007). Studies 
from the Western middle-class perspectives emphasize the independent agency of the 
one-year-old infant who is given the lead role in interactions (child-centered parenting 
style). 
Cultural Variation in Human Infants 
Infants’ phenotypic expression of engagement with caregivers and engagement with 
objects varies across human cultures. Human infants from different cultures have 
different socioemotional experiences, i.e., different developmental histories. It should 
not be surprising, therefore, that the effects of particular human settings can be seen as 
early as the first several weeks of life (e.g., Bard 2005), and in many social, emotional, 
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and interactional outcomes. For example, in rural and interdependent cultures, high 
value is placed on body movement and physical contact with young infants (Abels et al. 
2005; Keller et al. 2005a; Rogoff et al. 1993). Therefore, the amount of mutual gaze 
between infants and caregivers is reduced compared with Western norms (Keller 2007). 
There is also cultural variation in socialization practices surrounding object 
manipulation (e.g., Bakeman et al. 1990). In two rural settings in India, for example, 
three-month-olds were not given any toys (Abels et al. 2005), and in many traditional 
subsistence and hunter/gatherer cultures, there is very little caregiver encouragement, 
support, or attention paid to infant object manipulation (Bakeman et al. 1990; Hewlett & 
Lamb 2009; Rogoff et al. 1993). 
Infants in traditional, agrarian communities are socialized to value social harmony and 
obedience and to follow the caregiver’s lead (adult-centered parenting style: Greenfield 
et al. 2003, Keller et al. 2004). In these cultures, infants are expected to comply with 
adult demands, and they do not command adults to follow their wishes (e.g., Gaskins 
2006). Not only do infants in non-Western and rural settings spend significantly less 
time in joint attention activities, but they also exhibit significantly fewer pointing and 
showing gestures than do infants from Western, urban settings (Bakeman et al. 1990, 
Carpenter et al. 1998; Clarke-Stewart 1973; Salomo & Liszkowski 2012). 
Human Infants Raised in Severely Deprived Environments 
Owing to government policies in the 1960s, many Romanian infants were raised in 
orphanages that did not provide the kinds of emotional and other interactive experiences 
that human children typically experience. In these orphanages, infants spent 17.5 hours 
per day alone in their cribs (Vorria et al. 2003). Studies have shown deleterious effects 
on cognitive, socioemotional development and attachment relationships in tragically 
impoverished and neglected populations [Hennighausen & Lyons-Ruth 2006; Nelson et 
al. 2007; Rutter et al. 1999, 2010; Rutter & Engl. Rom. Adopt. (ERA) Study Team 
1998; Spitz 1946]. Human infants reared in Romanian orphanages had severely impaired 
or absolutely no joint attention skills (Kaler & Freeman 1994), and Rutter & ERA 
(1998) found between 30 and 300 times the background incidence of autism-like 
symptoms and severe deficits in communicative competence. The effects of early 
institutional care were still evident in follow-ups at 11 years (Rutter et al. 2007). 
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A prospective, randomized controlled experiment confirmed the earlier associations 
between prolonged privation and developmental outcomes (Nelson et al. 2007). Children 
randomly assigned to foster care (FCG) performed significantly better than did children 
randomly selected to remain in institutional care. For the FCG, adoption at two years of 
age or less was associated with better mental development scores than those associated 
with later adoption. Thus, both retrospective and prospective studies of human children 
exposed to unusual amounts of deprivation and neglect have identified long-term 
deleterious effects on cognitive functioning and socioemotional development, as well as 
an apparent dose-dependent response to institutional rearing (albeit with some 
remarkable potential for developmental catch-up, given subsequent good foster care; 
see, e.g., Rutter & ERA 1998). 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COGNITION IN CHIMPANZEES 
 
Although we have known for decades that developmental experiences impact cognitive 
development in chimpanzees, few studies have provided information on the role of 
experience in the development of social cognition in apes.  In this section, we review the 
studies that support our conclusion that chimpanzee infants, like human infants, develop 
joint attention and cooperation (among other triadic skills), based on developmental 
histories of engagement with social partners and engagement with objects (Figure 2). 
Social Engagement in Chimpanzee Infants 
It is in the realm of socioemotional development that we find a high degree of 
comparability between chimpanzees and humans and the earliest effects of 
developmental experiences in chimpanzees (Bard 2000, 2003; Bard et al. 2011). Like 
human newborns, chimpanzee newborns smile with a play face to familiar sights and 
sounds at about four weeks of age and laugh in response to tickles in the second month 
of life (e.g., Bard 2003, 2005). Newborn chimpanzees imitate facial actions of caregivers 
(Bard 2007). By 30 days of age, the specific rearing environment impacts the affective 
quality and amount of face-to-face interactions (Bard et al. 2011). For example, the 
number of smiles seen in chimpanzee infants was significantly higher (given positive 
interactive experiences with humans) or significantly lower (given little or no exposure 
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to en face interactions with humans) than in a group of human infants (raised in 
Providence, RI; Bard et al. 2011). If the chimpanzee infants experienced 30 days of 
interaction with their biological mother, then they did not smile during interactions with 
a human examiner but did smile in interactions with their mother (Bard 1994; Bard et al. 
2011). Thus, the types of social stimuli with which chimpanzee infants engage (a) 
develop, (b) differ depending on developmental experiences, and (c) are evident from 
very early in life, i.e., by 30 days of age. 
By three months of age, the amount of face-to-face interaction between infants and 
their chimpanzee mothers differs as a function of the caregiving environment (Bard et al. 
2005; see Lavelli & Fogel 2002 for similar findings with human infants). Developmental 
experiences have dramatic effects in the preferred modality of mutual engagement; in 
some chimpanzees, face-to-face interactions emerge from six to eight weeks of age, 
whereas in other groups, close physical contact is the preferred modality for mutual 
engagement (Bard et al. 2005). There is a range in phenotypes of preferred mutual 
engagement between infants and social partners among primates (e.g., Abels et al. 2005; 
Bard 1994, 2009; Bard et al. 2005; Bard & Russell 1999; Keller et al. 2005a,b; Plooij 
1984; Rogoff et al. 1993). 
Chimpanzee Infant Engagement with Objects 
Chimpanzee infants and human infants engage with objects in similar playful and 
manipulative ways, in rearing environments in which object play is valued and nurtured 
(Bard & Vauclair 1984; Fouts & Mills 1997; Hayes & Hayes 1954; Kellogg & Kellogg 
1933; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998; Temerlin 1976). “Enriched” chimpanzee infants 
experience warm and available caregivers who scaffold, praise, and comment on infants’ 
explorations with objects (e.g., Bard et al. 2013; Fouts & Mills 1997); mother-reared 
chimpanzee infants experience continuous physical contact, enriched social experiences, 
and infant-led explorations of the physical world independent of social interactions (e.g., 
Boesch, 2012; Goodall 1986; van Lawick-Goodall, 1968); human-reared nursery 
chimpanzee infants have extremely limited experiences, restricted access to objects and 
to caregivers, and poor-quality and low levels of interactions surrounding object 
manipulation even when caregivers are present (see Bard et al. 2014b, figure S4; van 
IJzendoorn et al. 2009; Vauclair & Bard 1983). A lack of exposure to objects in infancy 
can cause chimpanzees to be extremely fearful of new objects and avoid new objects 
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even many years later (Menzel 1964). These rearing experiences can also impact object 
manipulations that require more cognitive complexity, e.g., using objects as tools. For 
example, Furlong and colleagues (2008) compared tool use performance in chimpanzees 
from three backgrounds: those that had highly enriched rearing for most of their lives; 
those that had standard laboratory nursery experiences throughout their lives (from 
Povinelli 2000); and those with standard laboratory nursery for the first one to two years 
of life, followed by eight years at a highly enriched US sanctuary. Tool use performance 
varied systematically, with more sophisticated performance displayed by those 
chimpanzees with more enriched backgrounds. Thus, in chimpanzees, developmental 
experiences with object engagement have long-term effects, including effects on more 
complex abilities such as using objects as tools. 
Triadic Skills (Joint Attention/Shared Attention) in Chimpanzee Infants 
For chimpanzees, as well as humans, the dyadic engagements with social partners and 
with objects serve as the foundation for the emergence of joint attention and other triadic 
skills (Figure 2) (Bard et al. 2014a,b). A recent study demonstrated the presence of both 
joint attention and cooperation in chimpanzees as young as five months of age (Bard et 
al. 2014b). Joint attention was evident when young chimpanzees watched 
demonstrations or tried to imitate the object-related actions of social partners. The triadic 
skill of coordinated joint engagement in the social domain, i.e., cooperation, was evident 
when young chimpanzees anticipated actions (or reactions) of social partners in regular 
social games such as peek-a-boo or actively participated in the give-and-take of objects 
with a social partner. Previous developmental experience was a major, highly 
significant, factor predicting success in both types of social cognition (Bard et al. 
2014b). 
Developmental experiences during the first year of life have meaningful and large 
impacts on joint attention, cooperation, attachment, and communication (Bard 2000, 
2003; Bard et al. 2014a,b; van IJzendoorn et al. 2009; Vauclair & Bard 1983). For 
example, a chimpanzee toddler raised in an enriched family home exhibited pretend play 
with objects similar to that found in two-year-old humans (e.g., Hayes 1951). Young 
chimpanzees given explicit tuition have learned symbol systems comparable to those 
learned by 2--4-year-old human infants (e.g., Fouts & Mills 1997; Gardner et al. 1989; 
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993). 
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Older chimpanzees exhibit this cognitive triadic capacity in many behaviors, such as 
intentional communication, cooperation, pointing, and social referencing (Bard et al. 
2014a; Boesch 2012; Hobaiter et al. 2014; Leavens et al. 1996, 2004, 2005a,b, 2009; 
Leavens & Hopkins 1998, 1999; Russell et al. 1997). Developmental experiences have 
long-lasting effects on the triadic social cognition skills involved in communication, 
imitation, and social cognition (e.g., Carpenter et al. 1995; Davenport et al. 1973; 
Horowitz 2003; Leavens et al., 2009; Leavens & Hopkins 1998; Lyn et al. 2010; Menzel 
1964; Rumbaugh et al. 2008; Russell et al. 2011; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Tomasello et 
al. 1993a,b). Not surprisingly, differential developmental experiences are evident in 
brain structures of adult chimpanzees (Bogart et al. 2014), similar to those proposed for 
humans (Fox et al. 2010). Group-specific variants of tool use and intentionally 
communicative gestures have been documented in wild chimpanzees (summarized in 
Whiten et al. 1999) as well as captive chimpanzees (Bard et al. 2014a; Call & Tomasello 
1997; Pika & Liebal 2006; Pollick & de Waal 2007). Thus, there can be no doubt that 
chimpanzees exhibit joint attention and also exhibit a significant amount of phenotypic 
variation in social cognition. 
Chimpanzee infants, like human infants, develop emotional responses to caregivers, 
to examiners, and to objects, and these developmental experiences influence 
chimpanzees’ motivations to engage, their pleasure (or fear) in cooperation, and their 
ability to perform cognitively complex activities (e.g., Bard 1998, 2005; Bard & 
Gardner, 1996; Bard et al. 2014b; de Waal & Ferrari 2010; Fouts & Mills 1997; Menzel 
1964; Menzel et al. 1970; Russell et al. 1997; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993). We have 
known since the mid-1990s that young chimpanzees, like human toddlers, seek 
emotional messages about objects from favorite caregivers using a triadic skill known as 
social referencing (Russell et al. 1997). In social referencing, the chimpanzee’s 
emotional bond with a caregiver supports the sharing of affective information about 
objects. Therefore, when the caregiver gives a negative message about the object (I don’t 
like that object; it’s scary), then the infant avoids the object. Alternatively, when the 
caregiver gives a positive message about an object (I like that object; it’s a happy toy), 
the infant approaches and engages with the object. Additionally, some young 
chimpanzees may exhibit empathetic responses (comforting the caregiver when she 
expresses fear of the object) or spontaneous “showing” of objects (sharing attention to 
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objects for no reason other than mutual interest; Carpenter et al. 1995, Russell et al. 
1997). Boesch (2012) argued that social referencing was a component of theory of mind 
that occurred regularly in wild chimpanzees and furthermore presents convincing 
evidence of the chimpanzees’ world “being ‘transformed’ by the social culture to which 
an infant belongs” (pp. 149--50). 
Chimpanzees Raised in Institutional Nurseries 
Institutional nursery rearing of chimpanzees produces many deficits in emotional and 
cognitive development, just as similar rearing negatively influences cognitive 
development in humans (Smyke et al. 2007; van IJzendoorn et al. 2009; Zeanah et al. 
2005). The conditions of the great ape nursery at the Yerkes Primate Center from 1956 
to 1991 are briefly described in van IJzendoorn et al. (2009). In the period from 1956 to 
1961, some laboratory chimpanzees were raised in isolation from birth through two 
years of age, but few, if any, of these subjects have been used for comparative studies of 
social cognition. Isolation rearing produced individuals with severe and persistent 
stereotyped behavior (rocking, self-clasping, eye poking, etc.; Davenport & Menzel 
1963), extreme fear of and avoidance of novel objects (e.g., Menzel 1964), an inability 
to cope with stress, persistent social deficits, and sexual deficits in adulthood (e.g., 
Rogers & Davenport 1969). Isolation rearing, even if begun at two or three years of age 
(in wild-born chimpanzees) can cause persistent stereotypies and long-term deficits in 
social behavior (Kalcher et al. 2008). 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, many nursery-reared chimpanzee infants were raised in 
pairs or triads. Peer-group rearing was a major improvement over isolation rearing in 
terms of psychological health, as chimpanzees formed attachments, albeit with peers 
(e.g., Bard & Nadler 1983). In the late 1980s, with a new focus on psychological well-
being (e.g., Fritz 1986), larger peer groups were formed, allowing 4--6 same-aged peers 
to live together continuously in enlarged spaces. This practice is known as standard care 
because it typifies institutional nursery care at the Yerkes Center and other institutional 
ape nurseries in the United States and Europe. During the average day, infant 
chimpanzees raised in a standard laboratory nursery spent ~2 of every 24 hours with an 
adult human caregiver (Bard et al. 2011; Bard et al. 2014b; Spijkerman et al. 1996). At 
Yerkes, this human-raised nursery care resulted in 59% of 9-month-old chimpanzees 
having an abnormal attachment to an inanimate object (usually a towel) and 72% of 1-
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year-olds having disorganized attachment systems with their favorite human caregivers 
(van IJzendoorn et al. 2009). Secure, insecure-avoidant, and insecure-ambivalent 
classifications represent the various organized strategies emerging from an infant--
caregiver attachment system that allows infants to adapt to their environments. In 
contrast, disorganized attachment represents the absence of or major dysfunction in this 
system, an unfortunately common result when infants experience a neglectful or abusive 
environment (e.g., van IJzendoorn et al. 2009). 
Only at the Yerkes Primate Center, from 1991 to 1995, was a responsive care (RC) 
nursery in place (Bard 1996). For four hours of each weekday, chimpanzees younger 
than one year had a specially trained human researcher/caregiver who was dedicated to 
nurturing the chimpanzees’ species-typical communicative, social, and motor 
development (Bard et al. 2014a). Infants raised in RC, compared with standard care, had 
significantly higher levels of joint attention success and significantly higher cognitive 
scores (Bard et al. 2014b). However, even with the reduced caregiver--infant ratio (1.5 
to 1 in RC versus 12.5 to 1 in the standard nursery) and the increase in caregiver contact 
(300 more minutes in RC), RC infants spent most of their time with same-aged peers in 
the absence of adult caregivers (16 of every 24 hours during the week and 22 of 24 hours 
during weekends and holidays). This rearing environment resulted in 42% of RC 
chimpanzees having a disorganized attachment system, significantly less than was found 
in the standard nursery group (van IJzendoorn et al. 2009) but substantially more than 
we find in human nonclinical populations. 
Implications 
A substantial amount of evidence speaks to the power of early developmental 
experiences in shaping the social cognition of chimpanzees, an area that has received 
very little attention (but see Bard & Leavens 2009; Boesch 2007, 2012; Brüne et al. 
2006; Kalcher et al. 2008; Leavens & Bard 2011). Current comparative studies may state 
that the chimpanzee subjects were “human-raised,” but typically, this designation means 
that they were raised in standard laboratory nurseries as described above (as were infants 
in the 1980s and 1990s). The percentage of disorganized attachment in human-raised 
nursery chimpanzees (72% in standard care) is comparable to that of human infants 
raised in very poor Greek or Romanian orphanages (~67%; see Bard 2012, figure 14.2, 
based on data derived from van IJzendoorn et al. 2009; Smyke et al. 2007; Zeanah et al. 
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2005). Human-raised nursery-reared chimpanzees at 1 year of age had cognitive scores 
around 75, significantly lower than typically developing humans (with norms of 100; 
Bard et al. 2014b, figure S6) and remarkably similar to scores reported for human 
infants reared in substandard orphanages (an average of 66; Smyke et al. 2007). Raising 
chimpanzees in institutional nurseries significantly and negatively impacts their 
emotional and cognitive systems, with potentially long-lasting effects (Bard et al. 2014b; 
Brüne et al. 2006; Clay et al. 2012; Lyn et al. 2010; Menzel et al. 1963; Russell et al. 
2011; van IJzendoorn et al. 2009), prompting Menzel (1964) to argue that the effects of 
raising chimpanzee infants in isolation were not noticeably different from the effects of 
any nursery rearing on chimpanzees. Even chimpanzees living as adults in physically 
enriched sanctuaries suffer long-lasting effects of early trauma and institutional care 
(Ferdowsian et al. 2011; Kalcher et al. 2008). 
CONSEQUENCES OF IGNORING DEVELOPMENT IN PRIMATE SOCIAL 
COGNITION 
Current evolutionary theories of social cognition rely on monocultural data for humans, 
i.e., collected from educated and well-off people from Western, industrialized, 
democratic countries (known as WEIRD; Henrich et al. 2010). In many domains of adult 
cognition, ranging from basic perception to complex social cognition, WEIRD adults are 
extreme outliers. Current mainstream comparative theories tend to ignore variations in 
social cognition, even from human infants raised in non-Western, rural cultures. It is 
vital to incorporate cross-cultural developmental data into theories of social cognition to 
determine the precursors and sequalae of joint attention that are universal in humans 
across the full range of ecocultural contexts (e.g., Vinden 1999). In building 
evolutionary scenarios, it is important to acknowledge that Western industrialized 
society is extremely unlike the environment(s) of evolutionary adaptedness (e.g., Foley 
1996; Hewlett & Lamb 2009; Hrdy 2009; Symons 1992). Consideration of the diversity 
in outcomes among humans is essential in building meaningful and valid evolutionary 
theories of social cognition. 
We cannot measure the universality of a characteristic, or the cognitive capacity of a 
species, by investigating only members living in a single environmental niche. For 
example, some investigators assumed that the initiation of joint attention by pointing 
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was universal and species-unique to humans, but this conclusion was based on studies 
with only Western middle-class infants (e.g., Butterworth 2003). People in some human 
cultures do not point with their fingers (therefore manual pointing is not universal in our 
species), and pointing reliably occurs in chimpanzees and other apes (therefore, pointing 
is not species-unique; Hobaiter et al. 2014; Leavens 2004; Leavens et al. 2005b; Wilkins 
2003). It is only by documenting phenotypic variation in outcomes across groups that we 
can determine whether a characteristic is universal and/or species-unique (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Phenotypic plasticity in social cognition. For future comparative studies we suggest this 
design that embraces the impact of developmental experiences on social cognition phenotypes 
(adapted from Leavens et al. 2005a, 2008, 2010). Species differences may be concluded if 
phenotypic outcomes do not overlap between chimpanzees and humans, given there is overlap in 
their developmental experiences. 
On the basis of the data from studies of humans raised in Romanian orphanages and 
of apes reared in institutional nurseries, we purport that no researcher would assume that 
the institutionalized child is representative of the human species at large, and we argue 
that no researcher should assume that apes raised in institutional nurseries are the best 
representatives of their species (Leavens et al. 2010). Developmental experiences of 
such institutionalism clearly results in deficiencies in cognition, communication, and 
other socioemotional characteristics. One cannot generalize from the developmental 
profiles of these impoverished groups to the entire species. Unfortunately, very few 
contemporary researchers in comparative psychology give explicit consideration to how 
well their sample generalizes to the species (for exceptions, see Bard et al. 2014b; 
Boesch 2007; Furlong et al. 2008; Hayes 1951; Leavens 2004; Leavens et al. 2005a, 
2008, 2010; Lyn et al. 2010; Racine et al. 2008). 
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PROPOSING A STUDY DESIGN THAT EMBRACES DEVELOPMENTAL 
EXPERIENCES 
We offer a research design that embraces development by documenting phenotypic 
variation in outcomes as a function of different developmental experiences (Figure 3) 
(Leavens et al. 2005a, 2008, 2010). When discussing social cognition outcomes, it is 
critical, yet a surprisingly uncommon practice, to consider the effects of development 
(especially, developmental experiences or rearing) in describing the capacities of apes, 
our closest evolutionary relatives. In the many ways we have identified here, the field 
would benefit from observing phenotypic variation in social cognition as a function of 
developmental experiences in humans and all other primates. 
Multigroup comparisons are essential to specify whether types of social cognition are 
universal or species-unique because social cognitive outcomes of chimpanzees and 
humans are sensitive to developmental experiences. It remains a major task to 
systematically construct a model of the evolution of social cognition that builds on 
species comparisons containing developmental data (e.g., Deák et al. 2013; Jablonka & 
Lamb 2007; Syal & Finlay 2011). With this design, species differences could be 
concluded if there is no overlap in the phenotypic outcomes of chimpanzees and of 
humans, given that there is overlap in their developmental experiences. We propose that 
the use of this design (Figure 3), documenting the diversity and flexibility in outcomes 
and replacing the flawed experimental designs of the past (Figure 1), would support the 
construction of valid, logical, and grounded evolutionary theories of primate social 
cognition. 
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